Accounting Fraud in Daedalus Capital LLC Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Accounting Fraud in Daedalus Capital LLC - Essay Example This fraud scheme where Coleman was taking people’s money and promising them huge returns on their investments but then fail to deliver due to the unpredictability of the marketplace. The Illinois department prohibited the company from selling securities for a period of 90 days in which investigations would follow. The Illinois securities department would charge him with fraud in offering and selling securities, offering and selling of unregistered securities and offering investment advice while he was unregistered to do so. The Illinois Securities Department hope to prosecute through seeking as much evidence against him as possible something which the court in Missouri failed to do leading to the current situation being experienced in Chicago at the moment. Despite the charges brought against him in the court of law and the pending investigations, Coleman still maintains that his company is able to get the clients the promised 100% reward on their investment as promised despite the conditions in the market (Yerak, 2014). The first thing that humans when accused of fraud or inappropriate misconduct do is to deny any allegations. This happens even in cases where there is evidence of whatever magnitude or the individuals charged have a prior record of the same offense in the past. This is the case with Coleman where he has recorded in court as well as with the securities department in Missouri about committing fraud to his investors but he still maintains that it is not the case (Ferrell & Fraedrich, 2012). He strongly stands for his company’s activities and promises even though it is evident that he cannot fulfill them without any fraud occurring in the process and there is evidence to that effect. Coleman would have been better off keeping quiet about the whole situation until cleared or charged by the court for committing the fraud. Talking would only worsen the situation in case his claims were proven to be untrue.  

Money in Baseball Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words - 1

Money in Baseball - Research Paper Example This was the reason for the increase in the revenues of MLB. To increase the revenues, MLB had signed a deal with the eBay’s unit StubHub that permitted people to buy and sell tickets. This had affected the revenues of MLB and they were being benefited in rising revenues (Isidore, â€Å"Baseball close To Catching NFL as Top $ Sport†). The other sources of revenue generation that was utilized by MLB were the options such as official website of MLB selling different merchandises, tickets and other items through ‘satellite radio broadcasts’, television game packages and other options for revenue (Isidore, â€Å"Baseball Close To Catching NFL As Top $ Sport†). The radio broadcast at the initial phase was merely for free publicity, but as the game became more professional there were contracts between the radio broadcaster and the leagues. At the initial stage there were less revenue generated and it was only at a local level from the local radio broadcasts. Later around the year 1950, Liberty Broadcasting System added National radio broadcasts of the games played in the regular season. The inclusion of national radio as well as television broadcasts has helped in the teams in MLB to generate more revenues (Haupert, â€Å"The Economic History of Major League Baseball†). The television was used as the source for revenue. The league had contract with the television broadcaster and this became the source of revenue that started from 1946. There has been immense increase in the revenue from this source from 1946 till the current situation (Haupert, â€Å"The Economic History of Major League Baseball†). From the franchise value MLB earned revenues. They have created their brand value and this assisted in franchise value appraisal. In the year 1998, the latest team to join MLB had paid US $130 million to MLB for the privilege (Haupert, â€Å"The Economic History of Major League Baseball†).

Tourism and globalisation

Tourism and globalisation INTRODUCTION The overall world making (tourism and globalisation) highlights the trade which is going on in existing tourism industry. It also explains the effects of globalizing forces of post industrial movement of tourism. Moreover, it also emphasises the function of tourism which helps to produce the new global orders. During the whole session Prof Keith Holinshed have expressed different views towards worldmaking in tourism and globalisation of different authors. Some of the authors have highlighted about Disjuncture and Differences in the global economy, Globalization, Travel Migration and images of social life, Orientalisam, Worldmaking and ethnocentrism in tourism and also about sightseeing and sight exerperiencing from the article ‘intelligent tourist by Horne. Prof Keith Holinshed has also explained about the writing of Meethan who focuses on issues relating to problems of culture commodification in terms of social production of place, culture and consumption. He also shows the re lationship between tourism, globalisation, people and place. Discussion by Prof. Keith Hollinshead in the sessions Prof Keith Holinshed have explained during the Worldmaking session about different writing of authors out of which Colin Michael Hall focuses on tourism which is worlds largest industry and has many major economic environmental and social effects which are politically significant. He also addresses in the book about politics of tourism and gives us knowledge about the problems which are faced in tourism like terrorism and political instability, development and dependency, urban tourism development and its political problems etc. The author Appadurai highlights the relationship of the global cultural economy and globalisation in the worldmaking. He tells that globalization is a way to de-territorialisation but some boundaries are still existing that is he tells that there should be no deteritorialisation. He has divided the world into five dimensions that is ethnoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, and technoscapes. The author Axford says that globalization is a single place . It involves interconnection between some boundaries and dissolving of other boundaries. It is the interaction between economic, political and cultural forces to making the single world. Sardar has explained about Orientalism which is the knowledge of Asian culture, people and languages. He also provides highly original Asian view point and highlights how orientalism has modified and reinvested during the middle ages. (Sardar 1999, 78-4) Keith has also discussed about the importance of World Disney in America. He tells that Fjellmans writings offer a review of the theoretical insights which shows the representation and signification in culture. The representation and significant in making of culture is enclosed in Fjellmans work for commodification.He has also explained about the attention which turned to Fjemllman sees the creative techno-corporate ways in which the Disney companies catch the narratives in heritage/culture and reduce them via his preferred forms of destroy and it purely match to his own national and transnational interest. (Keith 1998. Current Issues in tourism. Vol. 1, pp 58). Meethan Text Kevin Meethan have mentioned about the analysis of tourism as a global phenomenon.It examine the links between the political economy and culture. It also produces a critical analysis of concepts like authenticity, the modern and primitive , and the problem of cultural commodification.It also provides the traditional ways in which the tourism have been formulated and calls for a new approach which concentrates on the role of tourism in dynamics of change and alteration to place and cultures in a globalised world. Globalisation is not entirely the part of international and transnational connections between places but rather include a different order of relationships structured across space and time. (Meethan, 2001, pp 34, ch-2).He has also explained that the production of tourist space which involves the material environment and the socio economic circumstance which give rise to its form as well as shortening symbolic orders of meaning for both hosts and guests. He also mentioned that tourism is best conceptualised as global process of commodificaiton and consumption involving sequences of people, image and culture.Meethan have covered the issues of identity in relation to culture and place and the themes of the place, identity and authenticity which will be investigate the complexities involved in the give and take between the tourist and host population.(Meethan, 2001: 7) .Some chapters have also examine the global political economy of tourist space which deal with a symbolic and cultural economy. He said it is also important to focus on the ways in which tourism used as form of economic and social development and how this in relations to the development of a global economic order. Conclusion: From the whole unit according to me Prof. Keith make us understanding about the issue of globalisation in todays world. He tries to give us the review of how to be a part of Worldmaking and knowledge about inter connection between tourism and globalisation. He also makes us understands the Muslim view western culture through the concept of Orientalism which was written by Sardar.Meetan tries to explain the old traditional view of tourism and he argues transformation of tourism which playes dynamic role in change and reformation of place and cultures in the globalised world. While Hall highlights the negative impact of modern tourism through giving the brief overview regarding terrorism, urban tourism development and political and economic instability. Moreover Meethan tells that after seeing the complexities of modern tourism the tourist and the host population will finally get involved in culture of tourist who comes from diffent countries and different religion. On the otherside Pr of Keith explains us the writing of Sardar as the impact of western culture on Muslim people through orientlaism. He tells that Orientalism has been used as a tool of representation of western culture and impacts on host population through exploring different tools like films, television, fictions and CD -Rooms. Conclusively I would like to tell that Prof Keith has given us a deep understanding about worldmaking tourism and globalisation and how the modern tourism has shown the impact of western culture where they consider the globalisation as a single place in the whole world.

The Singing School: An American Tradition :: essays research papers

The Singing School: An American Tradition   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The Singing School was an institution that was uniquely American. it was established to serve a dual purpose: the desire to create music and the need for sociability. Generations were taught to read and sing music by itinerant singing masters, who developed characteristic methods and materials of instruction, and distinctive performance practices. Through this institution, many people were given the opportunity to participate in music, either as a singer, a teacher, or as a composer. The Singing School foreshadowed the development of church choirs and musical societies.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Early settlers in this country brought with them their native English music, both sacred and secular. They made use of various Psalters compiled in Europe. It was not until 1640, however, that the Puritan ministers in America made their own translation of the psalms. The Bay Psalm Book was the first book printed in British North America and was widely used. The most distinguishing feature of this book was its rhymed and metered English poetry. This allowed a few tunes, having the same rhythms as the poetry, to be used as melodies for many psalms. In addition, the text employed the vernacular, and consequently promoted memorization. The ninth edition of the Bay Psalm Book, published in 1698, was the first edition published with tunes. This edition had printed the letters F-S-L-M, representing the solmization syllables fa, sol, la, and mi, under the notes. This indicates that there was a familiarity with and an interest in music instruction as applied to psalmody.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  It was not until the early 18th century, however, that as a direct result of agitation by ministers for a reformation in congregational singing, arguments were advanced promoting regular singing and the eventual establishment of singing schools.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The singing school grew out of the employment by the churches in New England of regular singing. Records indicate that the first singing school was probably established in Boston, the most advanced town in New England, around 1720.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The singing school gradually spread throughout New England during the next twenty-five years. Throughout the eighteenth century, the scope and span of the singing schools continued to grow. The advent of the 19th century saw singing schools established from Maine to Pennsylvania.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The first singing schools were church-oriented, due to the face that the original purpose of the schools was to improve congregational singing. After selecting a date (usually two to four weeks during the winter or between planting and harvesting of crops), a teacher was secured (in most cases, the local school master or an itinerant singing teacher), and location was established (either in the local school house or some other public building).

Philosophy of the Mind Essay

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Introduction The Critique is a treatise on metaphysics. Kant defines metaphysics as â€Å"a speculative cognition that is wholly isolated and rises entirely above being instructed by experience. It is a cognition through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, cognition through the application of concepts to intuition), so that here reason is to be its own pupil† (xiv). This remark alone indicates that the attempt to answer the question â€Å"How is metaphysics as science possible?†, places the question of the bearing of our empirical judgments on objects qua ontologically independent. Patently, that does not imply that the transcendental deductions will not have any ultimate bearing on such issues. It means nothing more or less than that the transcendental deductions are concerned with the question of the mere possibility of pure a priori judgments – i.e., how it is possible that we are cognitively capable of making synthetic a priori judgments at all – as an independent problem in its own right. The results of the investigation would provide the basis for a subsequent series of investigations into the bearing such judgments have or could have on ontologically independent objects independent of perception and judgment of them. But it is a simple matter of first things first – let us first see what transpires when we attempt to draw on our indigenous cognitive resources alone. The treatise is accordingly a â€Å"propadeutic† and a â€Å"preparation† and a â€Å"treatise on the method† for an ultimate system of pure reason (xxii). The first Critique is about finding the mind in nature hence nature’s dependence on that mind. The second Critique then shows us what efficacy that mind can have in actively shaping at least one aspect of nature — the phenomenal self. Although, this shaping of the self through reason has a wider impact in that through freedom, we gain a new perspective on the entire phenomenal world, the world of nature and value. That said, it is not a small matter to describe in such specificity and detail the particular faculties or powers of the mind. It seems plausible that by granting a mind-dependent nature, a different accounting for that nature could be constructed; the mind and its faculties could be sliced and diced in different ways than does Kant, although then we would be different creatures entirely — something Kant does not rule out. (For Kant, clearly, a creature with a different mental make-up could experience a different nature from the same things-in-themselves.) Given his particular recipe for the mind, Kant’s theory of freedom and morality reveals numerous things we can say about the faculty of reason. Kant begins by setting reason, which is not merely a receptive but an active faculty, apart from everything to do with physical or sensory matter, but he must ultimately find a way to unite it with matter, in the form of experience, in order for there to be freedom since, perhaps oddly, freedom as we think of it can only exist in the context of its lack — determinism. That we might see these realms as disparate only reflects a failure to take Kant’s mind-dependent construction of nature at its word. The answer to many of the apparent impossibilities many find in Kant’s theory of freedom is to see freedom not as an attempt to marry freedom and nature, but rather to marry reason (as author of freedom) and the understanding (as author of nature). Through reason’s law-imposing nature emerge moral entities — indeed, a phenomenal moral realm — and through the understanding (and sensation) emerge objects of nature — a realm of nature. If we take nature (as we experience it) as in any way a given, or even if mind-dependent, as somehow prior to freedom, the impossibilities are impossible to avoid. An Intelligible Faculty Understanding, reason and judgment are most often described, as faculties, that is, as faculties of the mind. Kant appears to distinguish between the passive (sensibility), the empirically conditioned but active (understanding) and the unconditionally active (reason). (575) From this we see that reason is unique among the faculties as being both wholly intelligible and active. Immediately we also see that, from one point of view, the problem of freedom is simply the problem of reason: how can an unconditionally active mental power that is outside space and time be efficacious with respect to that which is in time? How can the purely rational mind cause something? â€Å"Pure reason,† Kant writes, is â€Å"a purely intelligible faculty [that] is not subject to the form of time.† (579) As such, we can have no direct experience of it — other than the bare awareness found in the Fact of Reason. (Our psychological experience of ourselves is as appearances, not as things in themselves.) Pure practical reason is what comprises the intelligible will because it is the faculty that underlies all maxims (or actions) determining that will. Although it is law-giving (this is how it is active), it does not impose particular laws, that is, laws with empirical content, for to do so would remove its purely intelligible and a priori status. Rather, all it can offer is the form of a law. We see an example of this in the Categorical Imperative, with its admonition to test a maxim by universalizing it. It could perhaps be argued that reason simply is the intelligible will; or rather, that the intelligible will is reason. Yet the foundation of freedom, as Kant frequently points out, lies in the noumenal realm of which we can cognize nothing. Only pure practical reason can fit the bill with respect to freedom (Neiman, 1994, p.62-7). Logical Reasoning How does the reason we encounter in its logical guise lead to the reason that produces the problem of freedom, and the other troublesome ideas of the Dialectic? Reason’s logical role as the faculty of inference is perhaps its most celebrated aspect. Here, as elsewhere, its raw material is not the empirical object/sensory manifold but the unifying law or principle that, through inference, reveals some knowledge of an object to us, for example, in the simple syllogism.[1] Kant uses this kind of reasoning from which to extract reason’s guiding principle — its primary characteristic. He argues that â€Å"in inference, reason endeavors to reduce the varied and manifold knowledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest number of principles,† (361) revealing that reason is seeking â€Å"the highest possible unity,† but that this is â€Å"not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which is that of understanding.† (363) He ultimately reaches the following principle of reason: â€Å"to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.† Thus, Kant has traced the genesis of the â€Å"supreme principle of pure reason† that ultimately yields the transcendental ideas, and distinguishes reason’s role from that of the understanding (373). This also lies at the basis of Kant’s distinction between reason’s logical and transcendental, or â€Å"real,† use where reason is a the source of concepts and principles â€Å"which it does not borrow either from the sense or from the understanding.† (356) It is this principle of reason and what it yields that Kant then spends the major part of the Dialectic testing and examining, concluding that the principle itself appears sound, but warning of its seemingly unavoidable misuse. His way out, ultimately, is to fall back on the regulative-constitutive distinction: Thus pure reason, which at first seemed to promise nothing less than the extension of knowledge beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly understood, nothing but regulative principles†¦But if†¦they be misunderstood, and treated as constitutive principles of the transcendent knowledge, they give rise, by a dazzling and deceptive illusion, to persuasion and a merely fictitious knowledge, and therewith to contradictions and eternal disputes. (730) As we have already seen, this seemingly intractable position is itself resolved in favor of freedom via another distinction that is tightly linked to (if not emerges out of) constitutivity-regulativity — that between theoretical and practical — which reintroduces the possibility of a valid use of constitutive reason. In the entire faculty of reason only the practical can provide us with the means for going beyond the sensible world and provide cognitions of a supersensible order and connection, which, however, just because of this can be extended only so far as is directly necessary for pure practical purposes. (706) Thus pure practical reason’s principle takes in us the form of the moral law as the ultimate principle that strives systematize and unify our rules of action (our maxims), just as it sought to unify the rules of nature. And, like the principle we found to be at the root of logical reasoning, this law lies a priori in pure practical reason. Pure or Absolute Spontaneity Kant frequently describes freedom as pure or absolute spontaneity. He also ties freedom to reason and reason to spontaneity. As Kant also points out here, the understanding, as reason’s close cousin, if not identical twin, is also a faculty of spontaneity, but it is one that is limited by the requirements of possible experience and so applies itself to appearances. For the understanding, that which is given (sense, sensation) drives the production of nature, and the understanding’s spontaneity is what allows us to think any object of cognition, regardless of its actuality.[2] Thus, the understanding, which gives us nature, does not and cannot suffice to give us freedom precisely because it is too shackled to sensation and experience. For reason, unrestricted in the practical realm by the â€Å"is,† allows us to create moral entities (through creating the morally situated self), that is, reason as law-giving, as pure spontaneity is also freedom. A Given Nature Among the things that Kant’s various descriptions of reason tell us, is that it has a certain nature (that is, characteristics or features) that endows it with inevitable tendencies or drives. We become aware of these faculties or powers through what we do, and what and how we think, and of course we act and think by virtue of the faculties. (574) This nature appears to be given and, as such, it seems (at least from what Kant says of it) that it cannot be further explained nor analyzed. Of course, this nature is essentially our nature as rational beings. Kant frequently appeals to the nature of reason in explaining why it is that we seem always and everywhere inevitably ask the questions we ask (and draw the often erroneous conclusions we tend to draw about the world): There has always existed in the world, and there will always continue to exist, some kind of metaphysics, and with it the dialectic that is natural to pure reason. (xxxi) They [transcendental ideas] are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding. (384) Guyer finds Kant’s appeal to nature with respect to reason problematic, arguing that that â€Å"idea that our freedom itself is actually a product of nature† is paradoxical because â€Å"what is merely natural is precisely what would seem to be unfree rather than free.† (2000, p.375) Conclusion Kant insists that freedom has a central role in his philosophy; that freedom and its metaphysics are wholly bound up with the metaphysics of nature; and that at the root of both is the mind. Kant’s Critical corpus is built on the fact of our having minds composed of certain faculties or powers, passive (receptive) and active (spontaneous or even causal), which Kant analyzes based on the manner and matter of the experiences they yield us. Clearly, even if everything about reason upon which my case for understanding Kantian freedom is based is true, what seem to be antecedent assumptions about the mind and its faculties arguably remain unproven, and perhaps improvable. Since so much of what Kant argues makes up the mind is labeled intelligible — the faculty of reason for one — it seems we are still left, at the end of the day, with an even more crippling Kantian unknowability than that met with earlier. This unknowability covers that which is the foundation of the theory, and Kant could be accused of being more dogmatic than the dogmatists in asserting such a starting point. Yet, on another view, there are no â€Å"antecedent assumptions† in Kant’s theory about the mind, since it is precisely the make-up of the mind that the critical system is intended to uncover. This is at least part of Kant’s point when he argues we must consider having objects conform to our faculties of cognition, rather than the other way around — his famous second Copernican revolution (xvi-xvii). On that view, nature is a reflection of the mind, and so an investigation of nature is for Kant simply an investigation of the mind. The Hume: Mitigated Skepticism and Skeptical Conclusions Introduction Hume’s biographer, Ernest Mossner, offers this pertinent insight on Hume’s religious skepticism: How can we recognize [Hume’s] personal convictions on religion? The answer is plainly that we cannot—certainly not without considerable effort on our part and even then not definitively. The conclusions of a sceptic—even a mitigated sceptic—cannot be summarized in a one-two-three pattern or creed if for no other reason than that a sceptic, unlike other types of philosophers, is not altogether stable in his thinking, is perpetually rethinking his principles. Scepticism, first and last, is a frame of mind, neither a collection nor a system of doctrines. (Mossner, 1976, p.5) This section will demonstrate just how restless and inquiring Hume’s skepticism was in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In the Enquiry’s first section, Hume compares those who attempt to indoctrinate their religious dogmas to thieves who are unable to win a fair fight (that is, honestly persuade men to believe their delusive message) and who will then hide behind superstitious â€Å"intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness.† Chaced from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. (i, 11) Hume concludes the Enquiry’s first section by expressing the hope (indeed his intent) that his philosophical skepticism â€Å"can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error.† (i, 16) Although Hume is always careful to state that he is fighting dogmatism and â€Å"religious superstition†, it is not difficult to see that in the early sections of the Enquiry this amounts to anyone who believes that they possess knowledge of God. The easiest way to see the Enquiry’s skeptical pattern of reasoning is to see that Hume wages war on religious dogmatism on two fronts. The first front is in the early sections of the Enquiry where Hume will mount a general assault on abstruse metaphysics and dogmatic theology with his account of â€Å"true metaphysics† (i, 12), which is an understanding and application of the general principles of human nature. The second front is in sections x and xi where Hume launches particular attacks on theistic bastions of revelation and natural theology. General Assault: True Metaphysics We must first determine whether God is a possible object for human understanding. The first test for the idea of God is â€Å"from what impression is that supposed idea derived?† (ii, 22) The answer must be â€Å"none†, for we can find no vivid and forceful impression corresponding to that abstract and complex idea, â€Å"God†. Thus, if God’s existence is an â€Å"object of human reason or enquiry† (iv, 25) then God’s existence must either be a relation of ideas or a matter of fact. Clearly, God’s existence is not a â€Å"Proposition†¦ discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe† (iv, 25). God is a being—indeed the Supreme Being—so if God exists. His existence must be a matter of fact. â€Å"All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect.† (iv, 26) Knowledge of God (the original cause) thus must arise from causal knowledge. For Hume there are only two types of causes: particular and general causes. So God, the original cause, must either be first particular cause or the highest general cause or principle. Particular causes are the constant conjunction of two species of objects found in phenomena. God’s uniqueness precludes the possibility that God can be a particular cause: It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species [i.e.. Nature] I do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause [i.e., God]. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, I many instances, to be conjoined with each other. (xi, 148) In the Enquiry Hume also rejects as impossible a knowledge of God, the ultimate general cause or principle: It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation†¦ Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. (iv, 30) Hume limits the human understanding to knowledge of common life and experience (xii, 162). Clearly, however, God transcends human experience, so God cannot be an object of the understanding. Since the idea of God does not arise from the understanding, it must arise from some other faculty. Hume analyzes the idea of â€Å"God† (an infinitely powerful, wise and just entity) and shows that â€Å"God† is generated by the imagination through reflecting on human capacities and faculties and expanding them infinitely (ii, 19; and vii, 72). Hume’s general assault is directed against speculative metaphysics and dogmatic theology, which believes that God can be known by humans. And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. (i, 15) Particular Arguments for Theism From a religious viewpoint, Hume’s â€Å"true metaphysics† can be read as an assault on any dogmatic belief in God. In Enquiry sections x and xi Hume focuses his attack specifically on Theism (or one could be even more specific and say â€Å"Christianity†). In these two sections, Hume mounts an attack on the two pillars of Christianity: revelation and natural theology. Hume argues that neither revelation (reports of miracles) nor natural theology (the Design argument) can yield a belief in God that a reasonable man would assent to. By â€Å"reasonable man† here, Hume means the man who follows his â€Å"natural unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion† (x). As it can be seen from Hume’s argument in Enquiry x, he attempts to undermine the reasonableness of a belief in reported miracles1 using four lines of reasoning. First, â€Å"miracles† are violation of laws of nature. Any belief-system (secular or religious) must take as its foundation that there are inviolable laws of nature. Therefore, it is inconsistent to have a belief-system that is based on the testimony of miraculous events occurring. Miracles can thus never serve as the rational foundation for any belief system. Second, even if we knew miracles occurred, this would only establish a supematural entity who through â€Å"particular volitions† intervenes in nature and history. But miraculous events are useless in establishing what kind of supernatural power (or powers) it is that caused such events. This argument cannot establish whether the supernatural power is wise, foolish, or capricious. Or for that matter, this argument cannot establish that this supernatural power is God (the original cause and sustainer of the world). Third, admitting miracles based on testimony is self-defeating for theism. Other non-theistic and counter-theistic religions (the Gnostics, for example, who hold the creator is malevolent) also have miraculous testimonies that have as much claim to belief as reported Theistic miracles. Fourth, Theists who build their faith on miracles have it backwards: miracles can never justify religious faith. Rather, it is religious faith that justifies a belief in miracles. Section x arrives at a skeptical conclusion: we cannot know if a miraculous violation of law of nature occurred, and even if we could know they did occur such events could never be the foundation for a belief system such as Theism. In Section xi, Hume attacks the second pillar of theism, natural theology or reason’s attempt to understand God unaided by revelation. Hume’s argument against the Design argument of natural theology occurs in two levels: the first level is given by â€Å"the friend who loves skeptical paradoxes† (xi, 132) who draws out the consequences of accepting the Design argument. Let us grant (the â€Å"friend† argues) that there is a Divine Architect who designed nature. Humans can infer the nature or essence of this Architect only by carefully studying the design or order in the Architect’s creation, Nature. Has the Divine Architect designed this world in a way that a moral agent (one who is benevolent and just) would have designed it? The numerous gratuitous evils we discover in our world that appear unnecessary and unavoidable block us from inferring that the designer of our world is a benevolent and just moral agent. The second level of argument against natural theology is given by Hume himself, in his own voice. Whereas the first level granted the Design argument and drew out the anti-theistic consequences of the Design argument; in the second level Hume argues that there are compelling reasons against granting the Design argument. Because we discover a design in our world does not allow us to infer the existence of a designing intelligence. To put this point in another way: this argument states that because there is a causal order in our world, there must have been an original cause, God. But our knowledge of causation is only through experienced constant conjunction between two species of objects. We expect objects of type x to bring about changes in objects of type y because we have experienced this many times in the past. However, the original cause, God, is unique. Therefore we cannot make the required jump which is required by the Design argument that because there is causal order or design in our world there must be an original cause or designer (xi, 148). Faith in the Enquiry The outcome of both Hume’s general account of â€Å"true metaphysics† as well as his particular arguments against miracles and natural theology are skeptical. On the basis of reason we have no grounds to assent to God. Thus, if one assents to God, this assent is based not on reason but on faith: Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith, and divine revelation. (xii, 165). To draw the implication here, since Hume has shown in section xi that God has no foundation in reason or experience, a belief in God is therefore founded totally on faith. Hume’s appeals to faith in the Enquiry should be taken seriously and not regarded as sarcastic asides. We must understand that for Hume faith is a domain entirely outside of natural reason (i.e., understanding): And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it (the Christian Religion) is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. (x, 131) Hume’s argument is intended to show that a belief in God is, literally, unreasonable: it is outside the domain of reason. Hume is not endorsing faith, but pointing out the status of belief in God. One who accepts Hume’s position on God in the Enquiry recognizes that a belief in God, since it is unsupported by reason, must float in mid-air as if by a sorcerer’s trick. Some theists will face up to this consequence of theistic belief. But for most theists, upon realizing that their belief in God in unsupported by reason, their faith will come crashing down. Conclusion The Enquiry carefully lays out a program of Mitigated Skepticism: all knowledge must be limited to experience and common life. In his general account of â€Å"true metaphysics† Hume shows that given the weakness and limits of human nature, knowledge of God is impossible.   Then in his particular arguments of x and xi, Hume shows that neither reports of miracles (revelation) nor natural theology (reason) provide support for the theistic God. Hume’s aim in the Enquiry was skeptical or â€Å"agnostic†. A century before T.H. Huxley coined the term, in the Enquiry Hume wrote the first agnostic manifesto (Mossner). Comparison and Contrast Hume’s conception of reason and the role it plays are widely disputed, but enough can be agreed upon to at this stage make the points, in particular, that a feeling- or passion-based reason does not allow non-instrumental freedom. Korsgaard notes that Hume discusses several varieties of reason, but says that â€Å"Hume seems to say simply that all reasoning that has a motivational influence must start from a passion, that being the only possible source of motivation, and must proceed to the means to satisfy that passion, that being the only operation of reason that transmits motivational force.† (1996, p.314).   Onora O’Neill argues that for Kant, there can be no such thing as a merely instrumental reasoner: â€Å"Not only does he deny that reason is or ought to be the slave of the passions; he actually insists that there are and can be no merely instrumental reasoners.† (1989, p.52) Before looking at the differences, it is as well to point out what Kant and Hume have in common with respect to reason and cause. Both are trying to grapple with a similar tension — between reason as the fount of what can be known with certainty as set against the metaphysical tangles into which it so often leads us (manifest, for example, in antinomies for Kant and discussions of the infinite divisibility of space and time for Hume). In the end, Kant resolves this tension with his account of the roles of the faculties, particularly in the construction of knowledge, with an a priori reason and a distinction between reason as acting regulatively with respect to cognition and constitutively in the moral realm. In this, he sees reason as an unconditionally active faculty. Hume, on the contrary, while acknowledging the tension, holds that ultimately it cannot be resolved, and that while we continue to debate issues such as whether or not reason has efficacy or dominance over the passions, we will to all intents and purposes remain in nature’s leading rein. And, for Hume, reason is passive, inert. For both thinkers, reason has a nature or tendency that drives our thinking with a certain inevitability. Kant, as we have seen, frequently refers to reason’s â€Å"nature,† while Hume describes it in terms of instinct. In the end, though, their differences far outweigh what they share. For Hume, reason is subordinate to experience in a way that for Kant it is not, indeed cannot be. And this is where the contrast gains particular relevance with respect to freedom. Simon Blackburn describes it this way: Reason can inform us of the facts of the case. †¦ And it can inform us which actions are likely to cause which upshots. But beyond that, it is silent. The imprudent person, or the person of unbridled lust, malevolence, or sloth is bad, of course. We may even call them unreasonable, but in a sense that Hume considers improper. For, more accurately, it is not their reason that is at fault, but their passions. (1998, p.239) Hume considers several species of reason, for example demonstrative versus probable reasoning, and it is difficult to describe and choose one that can be considered the Humean or â€Å"empiricist† counterpart to Kantian reason.   In addition to his view of reason in general, Hume is quite specific in ruling out the possibility that such reason can in any way ground morality, and so it clearly cannot ground the kind of freedom we find in Kant. Consider Kant’s famous confession, that it was Hume’s critique of causality that woke him from his â€Å"dogmatic slumber†. Now, it seems to me that the significance of this remark is completely lost if it is thought to license a reading of the Critique as a ‘refutation of Hume’, that the Analogies are attempting to restore the epistemic foundation for Newtonian physics that Hume’s critique of causality had undermined, etc. As Kant explicitly states, what was for him significant about Hume’s critique of causality is that it was the thin end of a very large wedge, and a gateway into a vastly greater problem. Kant, in short, begins his investigation by agreeing with Hume’s conclusions regarding causality, but then goes further, formulating the problem in its most general form and then determining its corollaries with absolute rigor. Kant attests to the legitimacy of Hume’s critique of causality – for him Hume has incontrovertibly demonstrated that an a priori concept cannot be derived from a series of particulars. Accepting Hume’s conclusion, Kant then raises the next question: what, then, is the origin of such concepts? The skeptical conclusions Hume draws are, Kant contends, the result of his having considered â€Å"not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information†. In sum, rather than presenting an alternative program, we see that by his own admission Kant sought to elaborate on, to extend and probe in greater depth the same process of rational self-scrutiny that Hume had begun. His objective was not to refute but to develop Hume’s insight by grasping the entire problem of which Hume considered only a particular instance. What, then, is Hume’s problem considered in its most general form? Kant’s remarks indicate that, for him, the generalized version of Hume’s problem is the problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments – i.e., Kant’s generalization of Hume’s problem is the question of the possibility of a scientific metaphysics. Since Hume had shown that a priori concepts do not originate in experience, for Kant the resolution of the problem requires demonstrating the way in which all such concepts â€Å"spring from the pure understanding† While Hume had discovered a mere instance of the way in which in â€Å"judgments of a certain kind we go beyond our concept of the object† (Kant, p.792), we are required to examine what is common to the entire range of   such judgments.   Hume did not grasp the general problem since â€Å"he did not systematically survey all the kinds of a priori synthesis of understanding† (795). It is such a systematic survey, and an attempt to identify what they all have in common in order to consider the general phenomenon of our employing concepts that exceed the empirical content provided a posteriori as a single problem. Kant tells us is nothing other than â€Å"the working out of Hume’s problem in its greatest possible expansion†. The following definitions are submitted accordingly: a) Hume’s insight: Judgments about causality employ a concept that claims universal validity. But a concept derived from a series of particular instances cannot be universally valid. b) Kant’s generalization of Hume’s insight: We employ a range of concepts that claim universal validity. Each concept moreover presupposes an idea of universality as such.   No such concepts can originate from the particular instances perceived by the senses. Therefore, none of our ideas claiming universal validity, nor the idea of universality as such, can be derived from the particular instances perceived by the senses. Thus, for Kant, the general problem instantiated by Hume’s critique of causality is the following: c) Hume’s Point: No conception of universality, qua conception of universality, can be derived from empirical input in general. Our synthetic a priori judgments thus employ concepts whose content cannot be derived from experience. But there is more to the problem than this for Kant, since his question concerns not only the concepts that such judgments employ, but the very possibility of our making such judgments. Kant’s formulation of his central question thus covers not only the concepts that are employed in the judgments, but also the judgment considered as an act, as a cognitive process and achievement. The question of the very possibility of synthetic a priori judgments thus encompasses not only the question of how it is possible that we could make a judgment that makes so much as a mere claim to universal validity (given Hume’s Point), but also the problem of our cognitive capability to execute the act that employs such concepts. The reader should expect, as Kant states in the Introduction, a â€Å"critique of our power of pure reason itself† (27). Kant’s transcendental deductions are employed in an attempt to derive the necessary conditions of possibility our cognitive constitution must independently fulfill in order to account for the mere capacity to employ universal concepts in judgments that we in fact possess. Since, by Hume’s Point, universal concepts by definition cannot be derived from empirical content, we must attempt to discern what is contributed to empirical experience and judgment by the pure principles of subjectivity, considered in utter isolation from empirical input as such. References Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Guyer, Paul. (2000). Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hume, David. (1976). Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by LA. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mossner, Ernest Campbell. (1980). The Life of David Hume (2nd edition). Oxford: Clarendon Press,. Neiman, Susan. (1994) The Unity of Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. O’Neill, Onora. (1989). Constructions of Reason Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1]   â€Å"Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of knowledge, is the faculty of inferring, i.e., judging mediately (by subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment.)† (386); â€Å"Every syllogism is a mode of deducing knowledge from a principle.† (357) [2]   â€Å"If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind’s power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding.† (75)

The Second Half of Adolf Hitler’s Life

The world-renowned dictator of Germany, Adolf Hitler, was actually born as Austrian in 1889. It was during the second half of Hitler’s life that he began to realize German nationalism and anti-Semitism in Vienna, Austria.He had internalized and absorbed these ideas and decided to transfer to Munich, Germany where he gave up his Austrian citizenship by seeking the endorsement from the German nation. This happened in the year 1913.In 1914, World War II broke out and Hitler and used this occurrence to prove his loyalty to Germany which he considered as his new homeland. He served as a corporal in an infantry regiment and was decorated after being wounded in 1917 (â€Å"Adolf Hitler Biography,† n.d.).By 1918, Germany declared defeat and eventually surrendered and attributed this failure to the betrayal and treachery of the Jews as well as the Communist’s political rebellion. Hitler believed that in order to avoid this unpleasant incident from transpiring again, these so-called traitor groups must be abolished.Taking a different direction, Hitler decided to involve himself in politics by the year 1919 in that he signed up for the German Workers Party.In a year’s time he became the organization’s leader and later changed its name to National Socialist German Worker's Party or more popularly known as the Nazi. Hitler's platform was simple: create a new nation that included all German people and rebuild the German military forces (â€Å"Adolf Hitler Biography,† n.d.).Following World War I, the German army signed the Treaty of Versailles after which they were trimmed down in number and was obliged to disburse billions of dollars to the Allied powers for war damages thereby downgrading German reputation and resulting to economic depression and downfall.Subsequently, Hitler and the Nazis failed to recapture Germany in the supposed Beer Hal Putsch in 1923. This act was considered treason. As such, Hitler was punished for five years imprisonment, however, he only served it for nine months due to political demands. During Hitler’s stay in the penitentiary, he was able to write Mein Kampf (My Struggle), his political declaration and proposal for a Nazi government.In this manuscript, he proclaimed German superiority above other races and condemned the Jews as tainted among others. After the war, he even ordered the genocide of about six million Jews termed as the Holocaust. Hereon, Hitler advanced a dictatorial leadership to have power over the German population and inhibit those who rebel against him.During the 1930s, Hitler urged for a transformation of the German society upon the advent of political and economic flux and regression and this was heeded by the German people. In 1933, the Nazis gained recognition for these innovative agenda thus Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany.His leadership was tremendous in that he used media and press propaganda, large security force which used terror and inc arcerated Jews in concentration camps to signify Nazi authority in Germany.

Accounting Essay Example

Accounting Essay Example Accounting Essay Accounting Essay Importance of IFRS Name: Course: Institution: Date: Accounting The Amazon site experienced an outage, which ended up affecting other websites and servers. The problem began when the services at Amazon’s elastic block store service were interrupted. The main problem was a memory leak in the system. The monitoring system also failed, leading to the outage. The technicians had replaced the data collection server. The failure of the monitoring system enhanced the memory leak, leading it to get out of control (Williams, 2012). The replaced server did not work with the system well because it failed to transmit its domain name system in the right way, and this meant that the message did not reach some servers. The elastic block store provides much needed services to the elastic compute cloud, because it provides it with storage space. The elastic block store is one of the components in elastic computer cloud. The elastic compute cloud is one of the most important services because it provides the computing and networking bandwidth for websites and web applications. Therefore, interruptions of this service caused major interruptions and outages on the websites relying on the cloud computing offered by elastic compute cloud. Some of the other websites that were affected because of this outage included Reddit, Heroku, Imgur, Minecraft, HipChat, and foursquare among others. Customers to these sites could not access them. The systems could not perform the customers’ request. Initially, the company’s technicians were able to solve the problem in some areas, and the outage lasted for a few hours in most areas. However, the technicians were not able to resolve the problem, and the outages lasted for several more hours in many areas (Hutchinson, 2012). The problem had caused a lot of customer dissatisfaction after the outage. The company was able to find the main cause of the problem and they were able to resolve it, but not before affecting many customers in the process. The company initiated some measures, which it hoped would prevent such problems from happening in future. Among the measures that the company took, include developing a monitoring system that will alert the system when there is such a problem. The new system will sound the alarm, whenever there is a memory leak in the system. The company had to find ways of solving the problem with the memory leak. This process took some time, and some servers were down for more than three days, before the technicians could resolve the problem (Williams, 2012) One has to know the root cause of the problem when dealing with web outages. Some technicians fail at identifying the main cause and they end up taking a longer time to deal with the problem. Websites offer many valuable functions for companies. Companies have to find ways of preventing web outages, detecting them when they are about to occur, and dealing with the outages whenever they occur. One way to prevent web outages is to use an online processing system that operates in real time. This will reduce the chances caused by improper transmission within the system, and the server will get all the information (Gelinas, et al., 2011). Companies can depend on the customers input to detect whether there are any problems with the system. They can provide the needed space where the customers report bad experiences with the server. Most of the problems that the customers complain about may seem minor, but reporting them and looking into them earlier will prevent a small problem from escala ting. Companies need to use flexible technologies, which will allow for any changes within the system, and this will solve any future problems if the company decides to increase the amount of input data or to increasing processing (Croll Power, 2009). Other measures include encouraging customers to use web caches and reducing the server load. Looking for the less obvious problems, such as the functioning of the domain name systems is a sure way of preventing possible outages (Safe Resolve, 2011) References Croll, A., Power, S. (2009). Complete web monitoring: Watching your visitors, performance, communities, and competitors. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, Inc Gelinas, J. U., Dull, R. B., Wheeler, R. P. (2011). Accounting information systems. New York, NY: Cengage Learning Gibson, D. (2010). Managing risk in information systems. Sudbury, MD: Jones Bartlett Publishers Hutchinson, L. (2012). Amazon web services outage once again shows reality behind â€Å"the cloud†. Retrieved from http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/10/amazon-web-services-outage-once-again-shows-reality-behind-the-cloud/ Safe Resolve (2011). Prevent internet outages. Retrieved from http://help.saferesolve.com/index.html?internet_outages.htm Williams, A. (2012). Amazon web services outage caused by memory leak and failure in monitoring alarm. Retrieved from http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/27/amazon-web-services-outage-caused-by-memory-leak-and-failure-in-monitoring-alarm/